The Roots and Causes of This War
The Roots and Causes of This War
Sikka: Mamoun Eljak
Translated by: Salah Mohamed Khair
According to Qusai Hamrour, this war is not the cause of the collapse of the State. This same war is the result of the collapse and disintegration of the State since "The Sudan is not threatened by the stage of disintegration of the State, except perhaps in a metaphorical meaning, because the State has already reached this stage in advance. The challenge at the present time lies in how to rebuild the State, not maintaining the minimum survival of the State. We have been below that maintaining of the minimum survival of the State, for quite some time… This makes us face the reality by saying that we are under the zero stage in terms of the standard of the efficient state. One of the problems of rebuilding the state is that there are still manifestations of the State, which make some think there is a state, and then talk about reforming that institution or those laws in order to save the State. But the reality is that we have passed the opportunity for reform. At the present time, we have to think about comprehensive reviews in terms of reconstructing and redefinition that are different from just reforming or some changes on formality levels, leadership positions, and administrative rules."1 Hamrour goes on to write:
"Therefore, the so called the Rapid Support Forces, or the Rapid Support Militia, do not threaten us to cause the disintegration of the State, because they are actually the result of the disintegration of the State. Cause and effect are two very different things. A clear demonstration that the presence of the Rapid Support Forces is the result of the disintegration of the Sudanese State, the failure of its authorities, and the sad irony in the reality of the Sudanese State/ non-state is that these forces or militia, despite harmful and illogical presence in Sudan's present, have a legal presence and it is a State institution with jurisdiction. The most accurate description of the Rapid Support Forces, according to their history and origin, is that they are paramilitary forces or a parallel group to the army. These forces are regarded as a legally parallel group because they have been established by State authority and legalized under an act issued by the State (The Rapid Support Forces Act 2017. Initially, these forces received a direct training from the military, direct support from the State's, authority and green light to fight on behalf of the military – or rather to fight as as an autonomous army unit – in selected locations. The resources of these forces have been made under their command with the consent of the State and have given no objection to enter into contracts with third parties."2
According to Professor Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, part of the roots and causes of this war date back to the 1970's when the African Sahel region was hit by "waves of drought and desertification that made it unfit for human habitation, causing an existential ordeal to the population."3 Ibrahim added that the natural factors alone are not enough to explain what had happened, since "the life of the herders of the Sahel was undermined even before the disasters of drought and desertification. The policies of the State, of which some of the herdsmen were nationals, infringed against their rights to their land and blocked their access to its resources. The State prosecuted after the herders, in the name of modernity, with the policies of settlement because nomadic lifestyle is a imprudent habit. The State had allowed the herders' traditional pathways in favor of affluent investors who had access to funding from the State's banks. This alternative to investing in the lands of the nomads had been encouraged by some policies of the World Bank that stimulated the government to improve access to their land through mechanized agriculture and not leave the land to rudimentary herdsmen scouring its space without success. There is a considerable disagreement between modernity and nomadic lifestyle. The nature did not despise the African nomadic land such as the notion of modernity despised its inhabitants, since that notion wanted to replace their life with a life other than their own. As a result, their way of life was to leave those who hampered them in the conflict over the declining resources of pasture and water. Their nomadic life prevented them from the access to education, designed for the life of the stable population. The nomadic lifestyle and the consequent interruption of modern education had distanced them from having a voice in the policies of the State, to any extent. Of course, over time, a social environment had been created to breed not merely aridity in the life of its population, but it also made them naturally disposed for the will to change their status."4
In one of his articles, Dr. Abubakr Omar Al-Bushra, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry of the second transitional government, formed after the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement, lists part of the grievances of the nomadic herders. He pointed out to the "historical absence of the nomadic communities from development strategies of the Sudanese State, despite their significant economic participation."5
According to Ibrahim, what is happening in Khartoum can be accurately understood by reading it in the context of what has happened and is happening in Al-Genaina. He writes:
"It is feared that the prevailing perception that the brutal facts occurred to the Masalit tribe in Al-Genaina, in Darfur, is merely an effect of the war in Khartoum may lead us neither to understand what is happening in Al-Genaina nor in Khartoum, at once. Rather, what is happening in Khartoum is an effect of what has been happening in Al-Genaina since the 1990's. It is an appalling cloning of the negative of Al-Genaina, if one may use the language of photography. Looting, occupation of real estates, rape and intimidation in Khartoum are nothing but a cloning of the routine of the Janjaweed settlement, which has caused misery to the Masalit tribe for three decades."6
Then, Ibrahim embarks on a historical account of the nature of the conflict in Al-Genaina. He writes:
"The origin of the current crisis and plight of the Masalit tribe is the imbalance of the traditional equation between the pastoralists of Darfur, who happened to be predominantly Arab and its farmers, who happened to be Africans or Zurga (Blacks), in the local term. There is a local phrase that calls the pastoralists Al-Guroon (herders), while calling farmers Al-Juroon (places for storage of grain after harvesting). This resulted from desertification and drought which hit the Sahel, including Northern Darfur, since the early 1970's. The dreadful drought began in 1972 – 1973, reached its maximum level in 1984 – 199, and it has increased year by year since 2001. This drought reflected a demographic change that forced Sudanese and non-Sudanese herders from Chad and Libya to reside with the farmers, as they have traditionally agreed. Pastoralists were staying in their areas for seven months because of the length of autumn, and then they spend the summer months among farmer in a regular exchange cycle. But the outage of rain in the desert land prompted herders to prolong their stay between farmers more than usual. Because of this, the conflicts erupted between the herders and farmers over the lines of water and pasture. This imbalance was accompanied by qualitative cultural and demographic developments. The Bedouin Arabs woke up from their plight and their attention was drawn to the fact that they had lost their political rights in the Darfur region, which had been led by the African farmers' elite, because the Arabs overlooked the leadership and replaced it with nomadic life. The Arabs formed an organization called the Arab Community, for the first time in the early 1980's. This was executed in the context of Afro-Arab Islamic Sahel Project adopted by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in the 1970's. On the other hand, in the course of that alarming demographic change, the number of the population in Darfur had increased."7
There were ways to mitigate the effect of these ongoing conflicts and solve some of them customarily, but these ways have been invalidated for two reasons: "The first reason is that the herders no longer cross the farmers' lands to settle in their regular places, because desertification prevented them from doing so. Thus, the dispute between them over the assault of the livestock of a herder on a farm is no longer, as before. This conflict had turned into a dispute over resources in farmers' lands and settlement. The second reason is the coming up by the government of the ousted President, Omar Al-Bashir, with an Arab Islamist political project that viewed the dispute over the resources as an opportunity to be exploited by the government in favor of its project, not as a conflict over resources to be addressed by policies, such as development and equity. In this way, the Salvation Government initiated policies that violated historical norms related to the agricultural private lands, regulated by the British colonial government and the successive independence governments. The Salvation Government did not violate these norms, unless it wanted to reward a group for an excellent service it performed."8
Alex de Waal lists the history and causes of the conflict in Darfur. He writes:
"The violence that began in Darfur in 2003 had three causes. The first was Darfur’s geography. It is a vast and impoverished region, named for the historic sultanate of the Fur people, who make up a quarter of the population. A dozen other indigenous groups also call Darfur home, the largest of which are the Masalit and the Zaghawa. Darfur is home to Arab tribes, too, which are mainly pastoralist herders in the drier north and the savannas to the south, whose ancestors migrated to the region centuries ago. Together, they account for 40 percent of the population. Neglected by successive Sudanese governments and stricken by drought, Darfur’s social fabric began to tear in the 1980s. The population grew fast, partly through a high birth rate but also because Saharan Arab nomads migrated to Darfur in search of land. The fragile coexistence of farmers and herders began to break down. Ethnic conflicts pitted the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa against Arab tribes. Violence escalated, culminating in the conflagration of 2003–5, which cost the lives of more than 300,000 people. By 2009, intense conflict had subsided but peace was not in sight.
Footnotes
The Bursts of Arms and the Turmoil of Politics: Current Situation and the Revolution in the Sudan, Qusai Hamrour, Madameek, July 11, 2023.
ibid
The Westward Journey of Bani Hilal: Tragedy of the African Desert Land and War in the Sudan, Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, The Arabic Independent Newspaper, July 26, 2023.
ibid
A Civil Procedure Regarding the Nomads, Abubakr Omar, Madameek, September 11, 2023.
What Happened in Al-Genaina Doesn't Stay in Al-Genaina: Shame has been Grassy, Abdullah Ali Ibrahim, Attaghyeer Newspaper, June 26, 2023.
ibid
ibid
The New Crisis in Darfur: What America, the African Union, and the UN Can Do to Stop the Killing, Alex de Waal, The Foreign Affairs Magazine, September 18, 2023.